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Book Review

The First Amendment: Saving Us
From Ourselves
No Liberty for License: The Forgotten Logic
of the First Amendment
by David Lowenthal
Spence Publishing Company (1997)
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
“The First Amendment is not difficult to interpret.”2 However, its interpretation has “taken some wrong and dangerous
turns—not by malice, but by superficial thinking.”3 So concludes Dr. David Lowenthal4 in No Liberty for License: The
Forgotten Logic of the First Amendment. The book is a criticism
of the Supreme Court’s modern interpretation of the First
Amendment; “the Court made individual freedom its god—at
the expense of the moral, social, and political needs of ordered
society.”5
The attack on current First Amendment jurisprudence focuses on (1) its inadequacy in dealing with revolutionary
groups, e.g., the Ku Klux Klan or the Black Panthers; (2) its
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. DAVID LOWENTHAL, NO LIBERTY FOR LICENSE: THE FORGOTTEN LOGIC OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 272 (1997).
3. Id. at 271.
4. Dr. Lowenthal is a teacher of Political Science at Boston College. He received
undergraduate degrees from both Brooklyn College and New York University. He went
on to receive a Ph.D from the New School for Social Research.
5. LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at xiv.
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indulgence in obscenity; and (3) its establishment of a “wall of
separation” between church and state.6 More specifically, the
bulk of this assault is centered on the legacy of Justice
Holmes,7 a legacy that, according to Dr. Lowenthal, impermissibly broadened First Amendment interpretation to protect
revolutionary groups and obscenity. Beyond this, Dr. Lowenthal contends that the “wall of separation” between church and
state runs counter to the original intent of the framers.8 Each
prong of Dr. Lowenthal’s arguments reaches the same conclusion: the Supreme Court has led the country toward a slippery
slope of license and anarchy in its interpretation of the First
Amendment.
The book claims as its foundation the original intention and
meaning of the First Amendment,9 raising two questions: First,
has Dr. Lowenthal indeed discovered the true intent of the
framers? Second, are we bound by that original intention? As to
the former question, Dr. Lowenthal’s interpretations are questionable; they go even farther than other originalist arguments;
they are often based not on the words of the framers, but on the
philosophies of the day. The second question is equally troubling. “Originalism” is a much criticized and hotly debated theory of constitutional law. Yet, while recognizing this contention, Dr. Lowenthal gives the issue only shallow analysis.
Dr. Lowenthal argues that the Supreme Court erred in incorporating the First Amendment into the Fourteenth, asserting incorporation is both illogical and internally inconsistent
with the language of the First Amendment. While this may
very well be true, Dr. Lowenthal fails to adequately address the
Supreme Court’s actual rationale in incorporating the principles of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth.
The author concludes that the Supreme Court has compromised the original social compact of this nation in order to

6. See id. at xvii-xxi.
7. Indeed, this otherwise intelligent book is often undermined by Dr. Lowenthal’s ad hominem attacks on Justice Holmes. For example, Justice Holmes is denounced as being a confused voice for a “witch’s brew of philosophical notions” that he
had to borrow, “not being [a] great thinker [himself].” Id. at 53. Such attacks only serve
to undermine the book’s reasoning.
8. Throughout the book, Dr. Lowenthal “reserve[s] the term ‘founders’ for those
who helped write the Constitution and ‘framers’ for those who helped write the First
Amendment.” Id. at xxiii. For the sake of consistency, that pattern will be followed
throughout this Book Review.
9. See id. at xiii.
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champion the individual freedoms noted in the Constitution.
The Court has forgotten the obligations imposed by the social
compact. Without these obligations, there is no counterbalance
to personal liberty. Complete liberty, without limitation, degenerates into license.
II. REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS, OBSCENITY, RELIGION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
The book is actually a composition of three distinct aspects
of First Amendment jurisprudence. Dr. Lowenthal discusses
the status of revolutionary groups, obscenity, and separation of
church and state under the First Amendment. Each of these
sections is tied to the others by the notion that the First
Amendment’s interpretation has been tainted by a shift in philosophy; the founders and framers generally relied on the philosophy of Locke, with its accompanying social compact, while
the Supreme Court has focused on individual rights championed by Mill and even Darwin.10
A. Revolutionary Groups
The democracies in both the Wiemar Republic and Czechoslovakia collapsed due to legalized revolutionary parties. Ac-

10. For example, in discussing revolutionary groups, Dr. Lowenthal notes that
the philosophical basis for the position taken by Justices Holmes and Brandeis is the
works of Mill and Darwin. From Mill, the notion of supreme individual liberty is taken,
from Darwin, the idea that truth is “determined not by intrinsic merit but by the marketplace.” LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 44. These philosophies conflict, when applied
to revolutionary groups, with Locke’s ideas of the rights of man being bound up in a
social compact:
Locke’s philosophy of the rights of man was sweeping the world toward liberal representative democracy. Soon, Mill feared, the enemies of liberty
would be not kings, nobles, or priests but the people themselves, oppressing
minorities in both social and political life. The rule of the people seemed inexorably on its way to a secure dominion, but what effect would it have on individual liberty?
Id. at 45-46. In response to this perceived threat, Mill championed individual liberty.
He went as far as stating that the actual instigation of tyrannicide may be punished,
but a connection must be shown between the killing and the instigation. Thus, no action can be taken against the instigator until a crime has actually occurred as a result
of the instigation.
This is clearly impossible in the case of revolutionary groups. The crime that is
being committed, i.e., the overthrow of the government, itself insures that it will not be
punished. Is it even plausible to say that a successful revolutionary group would reverse course and punish the instigators of the rebellion? However, this is the very result reached in following Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test.
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cording to Dr. Lowenthal, America is closer than many realize
to a similar situation, due to the Supreme Court’s misguided
interpretations of the First Amendment.11 The underlying problem is a (seemingly) ever-expanding umbrella of protected
speech and press.
Dr. Lowenthal continues by arguing that the First Amendment was never meant to secure every right of speech, writing,
or other communication; the very presumption “is a supposition
too wild to be indulged by any rational man.”12 The Court’s
original test for First Amendment protection was the “clear
danger” test that left unprotected speech and press which could
be dangerous to the Republic.13
Emphasizing personal liberty, however, the Court revamped the “clear danger” test, adopting, in its place, the “clear
and present danger” test.14 Justice Holmes first coined this
phrase, in the First Amendment context, in his majority opinion in Schenck v. United States.15 Holmes’s position is this: absent a clear and present danger “of serious injury to the
state,”16 the speech is protected by the First Amendment. Even
speech which, if accepted, would lead to the downfall of the nation is acceptable if there is no present danger of violating the
law.17 Eventually, Justice Holmes’s position was accepted as
the Warren Court “shifted sharply in favor of individual lib11. The goal of the First Amendment was to secure “above all . . . republican government at the national level . . . . [T]he First Amendment cannot possibly have been
intended to protect political movements dedicated to the overthrow of republican government . . . .” LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 20. It was clear, through the early twentieth century, that both state and federal governments were free to make urging a party
to defy the law a crime in itself. In 1917, Judge Learned Hand said, “Words . . . which
have no purport but to counsel the violation of law cannot by any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is the final source of government in a democratic state.” Id. (quoting Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)). That is
to say, such language does not fall under the protective shield of the First Amendment.
12. Id. at 29 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §
1880 (5th ed. 1833)).
13. See id. at 26.
14. See id.
15. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1925).
16. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Dr.
Lowenthal considers this phrase disgraceful. “Even likely injury to individuals does not
qualify as sufficiently serious. Counseling the murder of an individual . . . is protected
by the First Amendment. Inciting a murder with a likelihood of its occurring is protected by the First Amendment.” LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 37. The reason is that
these individual injuries are not “serious injury to the state.” Whitney, 274 U.S. at 378
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 35.
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erty.”18
B. Obscenity
The shift to individual liberty has continued in the Court’s
more recent obscenity decisions. Although laws against obscenity were long upheld in America, Dr. Lowenthal points to their
decline during the period of the sexual revolution.
In 1973, the Court clarified the test for obscenity in Paris
Adult Theatres v. Slaton.19 A work that was prurient or patently offensive had to have “serious” social value to muster a
First Amendment challenge against regulation.20 Although this
clarity was needed, the Court’s test of patent offensiveness
was, according to Dr. Lowenthal, regrettably coupled with a
narrower field of application, limiting obscenity to pornography.21 Additionally, in Miller v. California,22 the Court further
narrowed the definition of obscenity to “hard-core pornography.” The most dangerous result of this decision was that “the
production of obscenity of every description short of the Court’s
narrow ban ha[s] become a flourishing industry.”23
In short, all forms of obscenity that fall outside of this narrow definition promulgated by the Supreme Court are thriving
in America and undermining the American family. “A thirtyyear-long judicial effort to expand liberty in the name of intellectual, literary, and artistic progress has resulted not in
greater thought, literature, and art but in their obvious degradation and vulgarization.”24
C. The “Wall of Separation” Between Church and State
Finally, the book deals with the Court’s “wall of separation”
between church and state. Relying on original intent, Dr.
Lowenthal argues this wall should never have been built. This
is a difficult originalist argument to make in light of contradictory statements made by several of the framers themselves.
Three distinct elements of the modern Court’s view of the

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 5.
413 U.S. 49 (1973).
See LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 136-37.
See id.
413 U.S. 15, 35 (1973).
LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 147.
Id.
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religious portion of the First Amendment are challenged: the
Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the definition of religion. The Court has incorporated the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby forbidding any state establishment of religion or inhibition of the free
exercise of religion.25 Dr. Lowenthal considers this proposition
inconsistent with the language of the First Amendment and,
therefore, rejects it. Further, there currently exists a nearly
complete blanket of separation between church and either federal or state government. Finally, the Court has broadly defined “religion,” including even “a . . . belief that is sincere and
meaningful [which] occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”26 This interpretation is wholly inconsistent with the intent of the framers of the First Amendment.
Dr. Lowenthal argues original intent did not establish a
firm “wall of separation” between church and state. Indeed,
non-preferential aid can, consistently with original intent, be
given to all religions. Additionally, neither the Establishment
Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause is offended by the government’s favoring religion over “irreligion.”27 However, the
modern Court has placed “irreligion” under the First Amendment’s umbrella. This must be remedied; “religion” must be defined restrictively, as being “anchored in beings or realities
that are permanent, transcending ordinary experience.”28
Next, the Supreme Court erroneously incorporated the
First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment. Dr. Lowenthal believes the language “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”29 implies that the states
were free to establish religion. The framers anticipated that
states would indeed establish religions, “respecting” which,
Congress could pass no laws. Further, with respect to the Free
Exercise Clause, religions should be prohibited from breaking
the law. For example, Congress was within its authority to forbid polygamous marriages although it impinged on the free exercise of religion. However, the Court has wavered on this issue, allowing, for instance, Jehovah’s Witnesses to refrain from
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id. at 222-44.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
See LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 226.
Id. at 256.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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saluting the flag where required in a school setting.
Once again, Dr. Lowenthal argues that Mill, the champion
of individual liberty, is the Court’s source for the transition
from the framers’ original intent. Only the banner of individual
liberty allows religions to violate laws and regulations. Only
under the banner of personal freedom can one so broadly define
“religion” as to encompass even those who do not believe in any
power higher than humankind.
III. ORIGINALISM AND ORIGINAL INTENT
A. Originalism—Are We Bound?
The first step in following Dr. Lowenthal’s argument is to
accept the notion that the original intent of the framers governs. Does it? Dr. Lowenthal’s reasoning is this: the framers
were steeped in the substantive and interpretive doctrine of
Blackstone and the philosophy of Locke. In interpreting statutes, Blackstone followed the doctrine of original intent. In creating the First Amendment, the framers incorporated meanings consistent with both Locke and Blackstone. Just as with
any statute, the Constitution should be interpreted with the intent of the framers in mind. Thus, we are limited to the philosophers of the day, mainly Locke, and the writings of the
framers to interpret the Constitution.
Interestingly, Dr. Lowenthal does not mention at any point
that any of the framers stated that they actually had the interpretive mode of Blackstone in mind when they enacted the
First Amendment. Rather, he states that they must have had it
in mind. Perhaps they did, but why is there no first-hand support cited for that conclusion?
Such an argument lends credence to the words of Justice
Brennan:
[Originalism] is a view that feigns self-effacing deference to
the specific judgments of those who forged our original social
compact. But in truth it is little more than arrogance cloaked
as humility. It is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage
we can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on application of principle to specific, contemporary questions.30

30. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 23, 25 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
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B. What was the Original Intent?

Assuming an examination of original intent is the correct
way to interpret the First Amendment, is Dr. Lowenthal’s interpretation of that intent correct? Recall the conclusions of another originalist, Robert Bork, about the First Amendment:
We know very little of the precise intentions of the framers and
ratifiers of the speech and press clauses of the first amendment. But we do know that they gave into the judges’ keeping
the value of preserving free expression and, in particular, the
preservation of political expression, which is commonly conceded to be the value at the core of these clauses.31

This statement reaches a conclusion that is difficult to reconcile
with Dr. Lowenthal’s own findings. Although Dr. Lowenthal’s
analysis may be correct, his conclusions are precipitously balanced upon the proof he offers; a stiff critical breeze could topple them.
Dr. Lowenthal’s rationale for his position on revolutionary
groups is illustrative of this point. As previously noted, his position is that the First Amendment does not protect the statements of revolutionary groups, as acceptance of these statements would result in the downfall of the very government
assigned to uphold the liberties of the First Amendment.32
What is the historical basis of this principle?
One would think that the first place to turn would be the
words of the framers themselves. What evidence could be
stronger than the express statement of the framers, “Our intent is X”? Instead, Dr. Lowenthal supports his position by relying on Sir William Blackstone and his Commentaries on the
Laws of England,33 giving only passing notice to the framers’
words—words that undermine the very Blackstonian view he
favors.
Blackstone noted that the government is free to “punish . . .
any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published,
shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious
tendency,” as it “is necessary for the preservation of peace and
good order, of government . . . .”34 This view, Dr. Lowenthal ar31. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 168 (1990) (emphasis added).
32. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
33. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 10.
34. IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 152-53
(21st ed., London 1847).
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gues, was adopted by the First Amendment.35 The federal government, regardless of the language of the First Amendment, is
allowed to prohibit seditious libel.
The framers further relied on the philosophy of Locke with
its social compact. This limited personal freedom where it contradicted the objectives of society. Even accepting the contention that the framers were steeped in Locke, should we give
this philosopher’s thoughts more credence in constitutional interpretation than the writings of the framers themselves? Indeed, when we look beyond Locke’s philosophy and into the
statements of the framers themselves, the notion that the federal government could limit even revolutionary speech quickly
becomes unstable.
Dr. Lowenthal cites two notable authorities that seem to
contradict his Blackstone/Locke argument of original intent—
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. “Both [of these framers]
claimed that the First Amendment from the outset had utterly
deprived the national government of control over speech and
press. . . .”36 Further, this position was adopted by the majority
of the legislature in reaction to the Alien and Sedition Acts in
1798, a mere seven years after the ratification of the First
Amendment.37
Madison and Jefferson both vehemently opposed the Alien
and Sedition Acts of 1798.38 Their Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were passed in reaction to these laws. Dr. Lowenthal
responds by pointing out that other framers, most notably
soon-to-be Chief Justice John Marshall, opposed the Virginia
and Kentucky resolutions. However, theirs was the minority
view. Madison and Jefferson both felt that the First Amendment forbade the federal government from controlling freedom
of speech.39 Although Jefferson felt that states had the authority to control freedom of speech, he too believed that the federal
government was completely barred by the First Amendment. In
light of the success of Madison’s and Jefferson’s resolutions,

35. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 10; see also Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 534 (1897) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that the Bill of Rights had
incorporated the liberties of English law with “no intention of disregarding the exceptions”).
36. LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 14.
37. See id. at 14-15.
38. See id. at 15.
39. See id. at 17.
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this view seems to have been the majority view.
Madison’s insistence that the First Amendment, as
adopted, forbade federal interference is clear from his opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts. Additionally, Madison’s
own proposal for the First Amendment forbade both state and
federal governments from depriving or abridging the people’s
“right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the
freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty,
shall be inviolable.”40 Jefferson was in agreement with Madison
that the First Amendment forbade interference by the federal
government.41
Dr. Lowenthal criticizes Madison’s view as follows: “Madison’s reasoning . . . falls short of showing that the words ‘freedom of speech and press’ in the First Amendment were expected to have any other meaning than the Blackstonian
meaning they demonstrably had in state constitutions.”42 However, this misses the point; did the framers of the First
Amendment of the federal Constitution intend for it to have the
Blackstonian meaning? Relying on Madison and Jefferson, the
answer is no. The only evidence Dr. Lowenthal provides to
counter this conclusion is the minority federalist view that was
rejected in the legislature’s reaction (spearheaded by Madison
and Jefferson) to the Alien and Sedition Acts.43
In summary, Dr. Lowenthal’s interpretation of original intent is, at least, questionable. He rejects the philosophy of two
of the founding fathers of our nation in order to reach his goal.
What is more troubling, his support is found in what is, admittedly, the minority view of the federalists. Yet, support through
Blackstone is consistent with English law at the time. When
interpreting the Constitution, who is the more reliable source
40. Id. at 14.
41. In a letter to Abigail Adams, Thomas Jefferson discussed the effect of the
First Amendment on slander. He said, “[W]e deny that Congress have a right to control
the freedom of the press.” Id. at 17. Though he went on to say that the states could
regulate these rights (bear in mind the Fourteenth Amendment had not yet been
passed, much less deemed to have incorporated the principles found in the First
Amendment) his prohibition of Congressional interference was absolute.
42. Id. at 16.
43. John Marshall (future Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) authored the Minority Report in opposition to Madison’s Virginia resolution (rejecting the Alien and
Sedition Acts as unconstitutional). Id. at 15. Although the report is well-reasoned in its
explanation of why Blackstonian philosophy should be accepted in interpreting the
First Amendment, the fact that it is the minority view only seven years after the adoption of the First Amendment speaks volumes about the framers’ actual intent.
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of original intent, Jefferson and Madison, on the one hand, or
Blackstone on the other? Indeed, given the federalists’ acceptance of the Blackstonian view, can the judiciary be faulted, on
originalist grounds, for following the views of Madison and Jefferson, views supported by Congress a mere seven years after
the passage of the First Amendment?
Dr. Lowenthal couches his argument against revolutionary
groups in the language of seditious libel. Again, however,
Bork’s conclusion concerning libel is illuminative. “Perhaps the
framers did not envision libel actions as a major threat to . . .
freedom [of, especially, political expression].”44 It is quite possible that the framers never even considered the issue. It becomes impossible to find original intent where none exists.
IV. INCORPORATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT INTO THE
FOURTEENTH
According to Dr. Lowenthal, the First Amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment in three separate
cases. The 1925 case of Gitlow v. New York45 incorporated the
Freedom of Speech and Press Clauses into the Fourteenth
Amendment; in 1940, the case of Cantwell v. Connecticut46 incorporated the Free Exercise Clause; and in 1947, Everson v.
Board of Education47 incorporated the Establishment Clause.
Dr. Lowenthal argues that the holdings in these cases were erroneous.
The heart of his argument is that it is not plausible to incorporate the language of the First Amendment because the
Amendment specifically reserves that power to the states. This
argument is based on Dr. Lowenthal’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause. That clause will be the focus of this section.
A. The Reservation of States’ Rights
The Establishment Clause reads, “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion.”48 Dr. Lowenthal
argues that this is “both a guarantee of no Federal religious es44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 16.
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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tablishment and a recognition of the power of the states to establish religions.”49 Just as the Tenth Amendment cannot be
incorporated because it is an express reservation of states’
power, so the First Amendment cannot be incorporated because
it is an implied reservation of states’ power. This view does
have historical support. Massachusetts, for example, had a
state-established religion early in its history. However, Dr.
Lowenthal points out that by 1940, every state constitution
contained a clause similar to the Establishment Clause. Thus,
even if this power was reserved to the states, the point has
been effectively mooted for the present by the states’ desire to
avoid establishments of religions. Even if Dr. Lowenthal were
correct that the Establishment Clause should not have been incorporated, a change in that rule of law would have no impact
on the country.
B. Incorporating Language or Principles?
Dr. Lowenthal argues that the plain language of the First
Amendment bars its incorporation into the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, only Justice Black favored such literal
incorporation of the First Amendment; when the Supreme
Court incorporated the First Amendment, it did so not because
it was in the Bill of Rights, but because the principle it rests on
is a fundamental right. Dr. Lowenthal is arguing against a
straw-man made up from concurring opinions of Justice Black,
which were never adopted by the Court.
The principle behind the Establishment Clause was to disallow a government-sustained religion. In the Bill of Rights,
this principle was enunciated with respect to Congress only. On
its own, each state has more or less echoed the language of the
Establishment Clause in its own Constitution. Again, this furthers the basic principle of separation. It is this principle,
which supports the plain language of the First Amendment,
that was incorporated by the Court.
The language of Duncan v. Louisiana,50 a Supreme Court
decision regarding the incorporation of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, is illustrative. The Court looked at whether the
rights guaranteed in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are
“fundamental rights.” The question is “whether [the] right is
49. LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 232.
50. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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among those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.’ ”51 In light of the fact that governmental establishment
of religion is barred not only by the Federal Constitution but
also every state constitution, it is plausible to state that the
principle of non-establishment is a “fundamental right.”
Indeed, the Court in Everson spoke of the First Amendment
as being the expression of the framers’ “feeling of abhorrence”
towards established religions.52 In determining that the Establishment Clause was incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court focused on “the light of [the First
Amendment’s] history and the evils it was designed forever to
suppress.”53 For these reasons, namely the principles behind it,
the First Amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment.
However, while this may well defeat Dr. Lowenthal’s argument, it does not necessarily defeat his position. How can the
right not to have state-established religions “lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions” when Massachusetts and
other states actually had state-established religions?
Thus, although Dr. Lowenthal’s own reasoning is incapable
of supporting his conclusion, there is at least one viable argument that his general position against incorporation is correct.
By itself, however, Dr. Lowenthal’s argument fails to address
the actual basis around which the Supreme Court’s rationale of
incorporation turned.
V. CONCLUSION
If nothing else, Dr. Lowenthal promulgates a necessary
warning. The “clear and present danger” test is inadequate to
deal with (especially successful) revolutionary groups and with
obscenity, which has had an overwhelmingly negative effect on
our society. Indeed, as for the role of religion in America, Jefferson himself pondered,
Can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have
removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the
people that these liberties are the gift of God? That they are
not to be violated but with his wrath? Indeed I tremble for my
51. Id. at 148 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
52. 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947).
53. Id. at 14-15.
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country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot
forever sleep.54

Beyond this, however, unanswered questions undermine
this well-reasoned book. How can a firm understanding of
original intent be founded solely on the theories of Blackstone
and Locke? How can we dismiss comments of the framers in direct contradiction to Dr. Lowenthal’s conclusions? It is difficult
to accept his solutions, especially where they are based on attenuated arguments of original intent. Thus, although the
country may be headed to hell in a hand-basket, it is a stretch
to argue that salvation lies in the original framework of the
First Amendment.
Cory A. Talbot

54. LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 190 (quoting The Complete Jefferson at 677
(1802) (Query XVIII of the Notes on Virginia, 1782)).

